ABSTRACT Cyber-physical network (CPN) as well as cyber-physical social computing and networking (CPSCN), as the next generation of computing and networking, utilize a wide variety of sensing devices with significant sensing capabilities. However, it face huge challenge that data packet is transmitted to destination security. Data packets can be dropped by malicious nodes in CPN/CPSCN, causing serious damage to the network. Thus, ensuring the security of data transmission is a crucial issue for wireless sensor networks which is one of the important component of CPN/CPSCN. In this paper, a trust with abstract information verified (TAIV) routing scheme is proposed to improve the data packet arrival ratio. In the TAIV scheme, backbone routing paths are created by constructing an optimal connected dominating set (CDS). CDS routing ensures communication among all nodes in the network. In addition, as the source node sends the data packet to the destination through the backbone routing path, the abstract information is also transmitted to the destination through the auxiliary routing path to allow the destination node to know whether data has been sent to it. Depending on whether the data packet is transmitted to the destination or dropped by the malicious node and whether the abstract message is transmitted to the destination successfully, the destination will reduce or increase the trust in nodes in this routing path accordingly. After a period of time, the trust information of nodes will be diffused by information exchange. If the trust information is sufficient, the malicious node, whose trust is lower than that of the normal node, will be identified and eliminated from the backbone routing path, reducing the number of malicious nodes in the backbone. Thus, the data packet arrival ratio will be improved. The theoretical analysis shows that compared with the previous scheme, the data packet arrival ratio increases by 4.251%-80.208%, and nearly all malicious nodes are identified while retaining long network lifetime.
of smart living for people [22] [23] [24] [25] . CPN/CPSCN, which are composed of large numbers of sensor nodes, intelligent devices, and mobile portable devices (smart phones, PDAs, iPads), are emerging as a promising platform for enabling a wide range of applications in both military and civilian domains [26] [27] [28] [29] . However, the security issue of sensor terminals poses significant challenges to the widespread use of CPN/CPSCN; the hardware of sensor devices are simple and deployed in an unattended environment, making it vulnerable to all types of attacks [26] [27] [28] . Therefore, security issues associated with CPN/CPSCN have attracted considerable attention from both academia and industry [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] . For CPN/CPSCN, attacks on communication among sensor nodes (sensor nodes, intelligent devices and mobile portable devices) are more common and also more difficult to defend against [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] because the aim of CPN/CPSCN is to collect data and then make smart decisions based on those data. If the network does not communicate or the collected data are wrong, significant property loss will occur [36] , [37] . For example, if some information about important property is blocked, such as information about rare animals, banks, battlefields, or health status, heavy damage to these properties and personnel could occur [38] , [39] , malicious node may forge malicious information, causing malicious messages to be received by intelligent devices and mobile portable devices, threatening the security of intelligent devices. Thus, it is significant to ensure secure communication among nodes. More than 30 types of blocking communication behaviors or strategies have been reported for WSNs which is one of important component of CPN/CPSCN [40] [41] [42] . The main attacks are black attacks [43] , [44] , clone attacks [45] , [46] , Dos attacks, and selective forwarding attacks [47] , [48] . These attacks not only block network communication but also consume energy to cause network death in advance [49] , [50] . Those attacks also exit in CPN/CPSCN. The energy issue of sensor terminals also poses significant challenges to the security strategy; because the sensor devices are small, the devices for supplying electricity are small, and thus their energy is limited. In general, the security scheme used to improve network security also consumes a certain amount of energy and will therefore increase the energy consumption of sensor nodes. Thus, designing a scheme with high efficiency is an important consideration for network security [35] .
Researchers have proposed secure routing strategies for IoTs [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] , but challenges remain to be addressed.
(1) Some studies have dealt with specific attacks, and there is no security strategy that is widely applicable to a variety of aggressive behaviors, which limits the effectiveness of these studies. For example, the goal in detecting a clone attack is to check whether there are clone nodes in addition to the check normal node [40] . Obviously, the effect of this strategy against other malicious attacks is very weak. References [42] , [43] , and [45] propose related methods against a selective forwarding attack, black attack or Dos attack, respectively. However, these schemes simply adopt a specific defense strategy for specific attacks without a wide range of applicability; thus, it is important to propose a secure scheme for multi-attack behavior. (2) Previous schemes only ensured the security of routing from the nodes to the sink, without considering the collaborative network formed by the nodes. In actuality, the routing path from the sensor node to the sink is only one of multiple routing paths. It is not sufficient to consider only the secure routing path from the sensor node to the sink. (3) Most security schemes based on trust [48] are based on the obtained trust of nodes, and the nodes in the network only know the communication status of the neighbor nodes. However, the number of hops in the routing path can reach several dozen in a large network, and it is not sufficient to know only the communication status of the neighbor nodes. In spite of some security routing policies are proposed, these strategies were proposed in the context of the knowable trustworthiness of nodes. The disadvantage of this strategy is that in Trust-based security routing strategy in a large-scale network, the network need to know the trust of the node. However, in the actual network, the node can only know the communication status of the neighbor nodes and cannot know the trust of all nodes in the routing path. Especially in the large-scale network, the routing path is often as many as dozens of hops. However, it is difficult to guarantee the security by just knowing the one-hop trust state of the neighbor node. Because the node may send the data packet to one node when it only knows the trust state of the neighbor node. However, despite the high degree of trust of its neighbors, it cannot guarantee the high trust of nodes on the transmission path and thus cannot guarantee the security of the routing path. Moreover, in the distributed route, the next hop of the route is often made by each node independently. For the sender, the routing path by which the packet is sent is unknowable, and thus it is more difficult to guarantee its security. Moreover, there is no feedback mechanism in most routing policies, even if the routing packets are blocked by the attacker, and the sender cannot determine whether the packets are sent to the destination. In summary, guaranteeing secure routing among sensor nodes warrants further study.
In this paper, a Trust with Abstract Information Verified (TAIV) routing scheme is proposed to provide secure routing among any sensor nodes. The main innovations of this paper are as follows:
(1) A TAIV routing scheme is proposed to provide secure routing among any sensor nodes. The main difference between TAIV and previous schemes is that the TAIV scheme features two disjointed routing paths: the backbone routing paths and the auxiliary routing path. The backbone path is used to send data packets, and the auxiliary path is used to transmit verified messages. Those two routing paths are formed by constructing a Connected Dominating Set (CDS) to ensure that all nodes can communicate by using CDS routing. At the same time, a verified message is transmitted using an independent routing path to improve network security.
(2) The TAIV routing scheme proposes a trust-based secure routing method. The trust scheme of this paper differs from that of previous schemes. First, the scheme of this paper is executed by CDS; after CDS construction, the node knows the construction of the node(s) in the routing path. If the data packet in the routing path is attacked, there must be malicious nodes in the routing path. The range in which the malicious nodes is located is small. The system can easily identify and determine the malicious node. Second, the success rate of the routing is improved through the trust based on the routing strategy. Initially, each node has the same degree of trust. If the data packet is transmitted to the destination, the trust of the node in the nodes in the routing path will increase. Otherwise, the trust in the nodes in the routing path will decrease. Because different nodes adopt different routing paths, the nodes superimpose the trust in the nodes from different routing paths. The degree of trust in malicious nodes is low in multiple routing paths, and thus the value of trust is lower than the trust value of the normal node, facilitating the location of the malicious node. Therefore, the TAIV scheme in this paper not only improves the security of the network route at low cost but also determines the location of malicious nodes.
(3) The effectiveness of the TAIV scheme is evaluated through extensive theoretical analyses and simulations. Because the TAIV scheme adopts a trust-based message confirmation mechanism, it can also confirm to some extent whether the data packet arrives safely. In addition, by evaluating the node trust, the malicious node can be excluded from the route, thereby further improving route security. We demonstrate that compared to previous schemes, the data packet arrival ratio is increased by 4.251%-80.208% from Fig. 15 , and nearly all malicious nodes are identified while retaining a long network lifetime.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related work is reviewed. The system model and problem statements are described in Section 3. The TAIV routing scheme is proposed to improve the security of routing for WSNs in Section 4. The performance analysis of the TAIV scheme is provided in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
The most important function of WSNs is to ensure communication among nodes. Routing is one of the most common communication methods and is the most widely used method in WSNs. With respect to the routing strategy, the main strategies are as follows:
A. ENERGY-CENTRIC ROUTING ALGORITHMS
As the limited energy is the tightest resource in WSNs, the greatest concern in early routing algorithm research was not the security of the route but an energy-efficient routing strategy. Thus, the first proposed routing algorithms mainly depended on the selection of paths to minimize the energy consumption of the route. Ettus and Shepard proposed the minimum transmission energy (MTE) routing scheme [37] , in which the node with the least energy consumption was selected as the next hop node. The Shortest routing algorithm is representative of this type of routing algorithm. In the Shortest routing algorithm, the criterion for selecting the next hop in the route is the shortest length of the routing path to the destination. However, some nodes in this method participate in numerous routes, resulting in much energy consumption than in other areas and premature death of the network [38] . Thus, subsequent researchers recognized that routing algorithms should consider not only energy efficiency but also the amount of energy remaining in each sensor to balance the energy consumption and thus improve network performance [38] . For example, Zytoune et al. proposed the uniform balancing energy routing protocol (UBERP) [39] . In this protocol, the criterion for selecting a routing algorithm is to choose nodes with small energy consumption to transmit the data packet to better balance the routing cost and energy consumption. Routing algorithms can be divided into central routing algorithms and distributed routing algorithms. A central routing algorithm generally requires a global topology of the network and needs a central node (usually the sink node) to determine the node's energy consumption and other information. After obtaining this information about the network, the optimal routing strategy is based on the central node. However, for large-scale WSNs, global information on the whole network is difficult to obtain or involves a huge cost. Moreover, the network status is constantly changing, presenting a challenge to central routing algorithms [40] . Distributed routing algorithms do not need to know the global network information, and each node makes independent routing decisions based on their own information, which can be adapted for a large-scale network. However, the routing result is not necessarily optimal. The core of this strategy is that the node independently calculates the cost to each neighbor node based on the cost function and selects the node with the lowest cost as the next hop of the route [38] .
B. SECURE ROUTING METHODS
Subsequent research established that there are a variety of network attacks and malicious nodes in the network, and thus security is an important consideration in addition to energy consumption in the routing algorithm. Thus, a large number of routing algorithms have been proposed for various attacks. Sun et al. [41] proposed a secure route based on the idea that the network is divided into two (or more) multi dataflow topologies (MDT). Data can be routed to sink through any MDT; thus, even if an attacker blocks one of the MDT routes, data can still reach the sink through the other MDT(s). This method increases the success rate of data routing and is effective against selective forwarding attacks, black attacks, and Dos attacks.
The main shortcomings of this approach are as follows. (a) Data are sent to the sink by more than two MDTs. Thus, the energy consumption is twice that of the previous strategy or higher, with a more serious impact on the network lifetime. (b) Establishing two or more completely non-coincident MDTs is difficult to achieve in some sparse networks. (c) There is no method for positioning and discovering the attack source, and thus this completely passive routing method cannot provide guidance on avoiding the attack source. (d) The system establishes the routing topology to the sink but cannot establish MDTs among any nodes and therefore cannot adapt to communication among any sensor nodes. The TAIV scheme proposed in this paper compensates for the lack of MDT strategy: (a) first, in the TAIV scheme, data transmission does not need to be repeated more than 2 times. TAIV sends a data packet and summary information, but because the length of the summary information is much smaller than that of the data packet, the proposed algorithm has far lower energy efficiency than the MDT strategy. (b) The summary information of the TAIV scheme is a feedback message that allows the source node to obtain the status of data transmission, which is not present in the MDT strategy. (c) The TAIV scheme can be used to ensure communication among the nodes, whereas the MDT scheme ensures communication between the sink and the node. (d) The TAIV scheme is a learning-based secure routing method that uses the information of the previous route to indicate the trust of the nodes and thus guide the next route to avoid malicious nodes.
Another effective routing strategy is the multi-routing with data shares strategy. This strategy is also more effective against most attack. The SEDR scheme in [42] is a very classic fragmented multi-routing strategy. In the SEDR scheme, the data packet is divided into M shares, and each share is transmitted to the sink along different routing paths. The sink only needs to receive T shares to restore the contents of the data packet. If the number of shares received by the attacker is less than T, the contents of the data packet cannot be obtained. This method can effectively improve the security of data routing.
Xiao, et al. [43] proposed a checkpoint-based multi-hop acknowledgement scheme (CHEMAS) against selective forwarding attacks (SFAs). In CHEMAS, when the source nodes send data to the sink, a certain number of nodes are selected as checkpoint nodes. Each checkpoint node should return ACK to the upstream node of the routing path when it receives the data packet. The ACK packet contains the time to live (TTL) of the ACK packet. In the process of ACK routing, the TTL equals minus 1 when one checkpoint node is passed by. When TTL is 0, ACK is not routed. Once each checkpoint node receives the data packets, it awaits the arrival of ACK. If the checkpoint node obtains a sufficient number of ACKs, the routing is normal; otherwise, there are malicious nodes in the routing path, and an alert message is sent to the source node. Thus, CHEMAS has the capacity to detect and identify malicious nodes. However, this strategy only considers secure routing from the sensor nodes to the sink. In addition, because the data packet and ACK are transmitted along the same routing path, they are vulnerable to attack by an attacker. An improved method has been described [44] .
C. TRUST ROUTING METHODS
Another way to avoid attacks and improve the success rate of routing is a trusted route. The selection of trusted nodes in a WSN has been studied extensively. The main characteristic of these studies is that when a route is established, the node with a high degree of trust is selected because that node has a high probability of data transfer. The probability that the data packet will be transmitted to the sink is therefore higher. Most research on these methods has involved TRIP [45] and SensorTrust [46] . The ActiveTrust scheme is a relatively innovative method of active trust state acquisition [47] . The ActiveTrust scheme initiates multiple probe routes by making full use of the energy of the far-sink area. Accordingly, the trust of the node can be obtained before the data is routed, and a black hole can be avoided. The main performance indicators in the ActiveTrust scheme, i.e., energy efficiency, routing success and effectiveness, are stronger than those of existing strategies. However, the ActiveTrust scheme is still a strategy for routing to the sink and cannot be applied to the case of communication between any sensor nodes. Additional related work can be found in [50] [51] [52] .
Reference [53] proposed a CBDS scheme to detect a malicious attack caused by malicious nodes, and establish the efficient route in the network to carry the data from source node to destination node without any data loss and establish the efficient route by using the routing scheme called DSR. The CBDS scheme takes the advantage of both proactive and reactive mechanism to achieve network performance.
Reference [54] proposed a trust-based reactive multipath routing protocol, ad hoc on-demand trusted-path distance vector (AOTDV). This protocol is able to discover multiple loop-free paths as candidates in one route discovery. These paths are evaluated by two aspects: hop counts and trust values. This two-dimensional evaluation provides a flexible and feasible approach to choose the shortest path from the candidates that meet the requirements of data packets for dependability or trust [55] .
In many applications, the deployment of sensor nodes is carried out in an ad-hoc fashion without careful examination, it is desirable to ensure the source to sink privacy and maximize the lifetime of the network, by finding secure energy-efficient route discovery and forwarding mechanisms. It is important to make them secure against various types of threats. Thus, Reference [56] is to highlight routing based security threats, provide a detailed assessment of existing solutions and present a Trust-based Energy Efficient Secure Routing Protocol. The network is divided into s mall clusters. The secure routing protocols is designed according energy consumption. The process is divided into three phases: (1) neighbor discovery phase, (2) cluster Formation phases and data transmission phase. The data packet can be transmitted to the sink security according to the above steps.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT A. THE NETWORK MODEL
(1) We consider a CPN/CPSCN consisting of n homogenous static sensor nodes v i |i ∈ {1..n}, M {v = v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } deployed over a 2-D circular surveillance field with network VOLUME 6, 2018 radius is R. The communication radius of sensor node is r, and the energy consumption of the nodes is limited. Sensor nodes monitor their surroundings, and once an event occurs, the nodes can transmit the data packet to other nodes using CDSs [19] , [20] .
(2) A smaller number of malicious nodes is considered [35] , [42] , [58] because if the number of malicious nodes is greater than the number of normal nodes in the network, network security cannot be guaranteed regardless of the type of security measure.
(3) In this paper, a node can transmit data to any node in the network. In order to reduce the network transmission delay, in the strategy proposed in this paper, the first is to establish two CDSs. That is that network establishes a network of dominator nodes set according to the degree of nodes. These dominators set can well connect the entire network together. When a packet needs to be transmitted to a destination node, the node transmits the message along the dominator nodes in the CDSs to the destination node.
B. ENERGY CONSUMPTION MODEL
Adopting a typical energy consumption model as in [7] and [13] , the energy consumption for transmission E t is denoted by Eq. (1). The energy consumption E r for receiving is denoted in Eq. (2), where E elec represents the transmitting circuit loss. Both the free space (d 2 power loss) and the multipath fading (d 4 power loss) channel models are used in the model, depending on the distance between the transmitter and receiver. ε fs and ε amp are the energy required for power amplification in the two models, respectively. l denotes the data bits. The above parameter settings are given in Table 1 as adopted from [7] and [13] . 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENTS
The main focus of this paper is to design a new TAIV routing scheme to improve the data packet arrival ratio in CPN/CPSCN. The goal of the TAIV scheme is to delete malicious nodes in the routing path and thus improve the data packet arrival ratio, which can be categorized into the following aspects:
(1) A scheme to locate the attack source quickly when defending against attacks.
Considering the routing path d k i of data transmission from node i to node k, b a is the amount of data collected on the destination in this routing path. If the network wants to identify malicious nodes quickly, information about the malicious nodes should be abundant. Thus, the aim is to maximize the amount of data packet T in the network:
(2) Maximization of the data packet arrival ratio. The arrival ratio refers to the ratio of the number of data packets received at the destinations to the total number of data packets send by the network nodes. In the network, fewer malicious nodes are desirable because malicious nodes can drop data packets. Considering ℘ is the number of data packets that arrive at their destinations successfully, n is the number of nodes in the network, and the ratio of data packets generated to one node in the network is λ. The formula to maximize the data packet arrival ratio can be expressed as follows:
In general, compromising optimization occurs in the performance indexes above. The higher the amount of data T, the higher the arrival ratio . In summary, the optimization scheme in this paper is as follows.
In this paper, we give the table 2 to explain the parameters in this paper. 
IV. MAIN DESIGN OF TAIV A. RESEARCH MOTIVATION
This paper is mainly motivated by the following two considerations.
(1) Two independent CDSs are established. The main CDS is used to transmit data, and the auxiliary CDS is used to return the verified information, which can be securely routed among any of nodes in the network. Compared to MDT scheme [59] , the proposed scheme not only establishes routing among nodes but also reduces the amount of data while establishing a valid destination node feedback mechanism. In Figure 1 , nodes v 4 , v 9 and v 13 are malicious nodes. When a data packet is transmitted to these malicious nodes, they will drop the data packet with a certain probability, resulting in serious effects on the network. In particular, when malicious nodes are in the backbone, most of the information will be damaged. In case of an attack, the proposed scheme builds a backbone for transmitting data packets and an auxiliary routing path for transmitting abstract information. Abstract information is refer to the node sends information for verifying whether the data reaches the destination node normally, and the data part of the information is empty. When the source node sends a packet to the destination node, the source node sends abstract information along the auxiliary path to the destination node at the same time. When the destination node receives the abstract information and does not receive the data when the packet transmission time exceeds a fixed time, then it can determine the existence of malicious nodes in the CDS, the trust of all nodes in the routing path have dropped. Or the trust of all nodes in the routing path will be increased if the destination receives the data packet.
(2) Locating and avoiding malicious nodes using the trustbased method to further improve routing security.
In previous scheme, when a data packet is dropped, the destination will not receive the data packet, and even doesn't know whether data packet is transmitted. However in this paper, when the source node sends data packet to destination along backbone routing path, it also sends the abstract information along the auxiliary routing path to the destination node. If the abstract information transmitted along the auxiliary routing path is successfully transmitted to the destination node. After a certain period of time, if the destination node does not receive the data packet transmitted from the CDS, the destination node can predict the existence of a malicious node on the CDS routing path. Therefore, this will be very good to determine the malicious node.
Different nodes transmit information to other nodes along different routes. Malicious nodes are intersection nodes in these routing paths, and thus the trust in the malicious nodes in these routing paths will be reduced. Thus, the probability that the trust in normal nodes will be reduced is lower. The speed of reducing trust of malicious nodes is faster than the speed of reducing trust of normal nodes, thus malicious nodes will be located and avoided, thereby improving network security.
B. OVERVIEW OF THE TAIV SCHEME
However, in the strategy proposed in this paper, we first establish two routing paths. Establishing a routing path mainly bases on the degree of neighbor nodes of nodes, the energy consumption of nodes and the trust of nodes. However, in order to balance the energy consumption of the network as much as possible, the two non-connected routing paths should be ensured in the network as far as possible, but if it is not possible to guarantee two non-connected network routing path, network can establish two optimal routing path when ensure network performance.
The structure of abstract information in the TAIV scheme is illustrated in Figure 2 and is similar to [50] , each abstract information is mainly composed of the following fields: (1) the Source ID, which denotes the source node ID of the packet; (2) the Destination ID, which denotes the destination node ID of the packet; (3) the Information ID, which denotes the information ID; (4) the time for transmitting the data packet from the source node.
The Source ID refers to the node ID that generates the data packet sent to the destination. When one node sends a data packet to the destination, the source node also sends abstract information to the destination to identify malicious nodes. The Destination ID is the destination ID and guides the routing of the abstract information. The time required to transmit the data packet of the source node is used to evaluate whether the data packet is dropped by malicious nodes. When the abstract information arrives at the destination, after time slot τ , the destination will determine that the data packet was dropped. In the TAIV scheme, nodes not only transmit data to the destination but also transmit abstract information to any node VOLUME 6, 2018 in the network. The system first builds two disjointed routing paths. One is used to transmit the data packet and is called the backbone. The other is used to transmit abstract information and is called the auxiliary routing path. This routing provides verification to determine if the data packet arrives at the destination successfully to enhance the security of the network. Sending abstract information is helpful to judge whether the data sent by the source node can safely reach the destination node and whether the routing path is reliable based on the arrival of the data packet. Because the trust in malicious nodes is lower than the trust in normal nodes, the malicious nodes will be located and avoided to improve network security.
(1) The first process is to build two disjoint CDSs, the method for constructing the backbone is as follows.
To ensure that the data packet arrives at the destination quickly, the backbone should have the following features: (1) selection of malicious nodes as dominators should be avoided; (2) nodes with less energy consumption are selected as dominators; (3) the number of nodes in the backbone should decrease as quickly as possible. (4) Nodes in the backbone should cover the entire network.
The backbone CDS is built based on the number of branches of a node, the remaining energy of the node, and the trust level of the nodes. Three sets are considered when building the backbone: is the set of dominators, with an initial value = φ. shows the set of dominates; its initial value is = {v 1 , v 2 , v 3 . . . v n }. B is the ID of the neighboring dominator; it initial value is B = φ. Because the probability that malicious node drops data packet is p, if
the node is regarded as a normal node.
First, one node with maximum degree in and for which at least one of the neighbor nodes is not in the B set is selected. If multiple nodes have the same degree, the node with the smallest ID is selected. If n b n b +n g > p for the node, the average energy consumption of this node is compared with the average energy consumption of the neighbor nodes. If its energy consumption is higher than that of its neighbors, the node is selected as a dominator. Then this node's ID is added to the set and deleted from the set. The IDs of all neighbor nodes are added to the B set.
Second, if all neighbor nodes of the selected node are in the B set, the selected node will be dropped. Another greater degree of node in is selected, and the remainder of the process is the same as the first step.
Third, if n b n b +n g < p for the node, the selected node is dropped, and another greater degree of node in is selected. The remainder of the process is the same as the first steps.
Finally, the number of nodes in the backbone should decrease as soon as possible to reduce transmission delay. Thus, the method for reducing redundant data is the same as in [54] . (1) A dominator connects to the CDS through a connector [21] . (2) A dominator connects to CDS by two connectors, and the two connectors are connected to each other [21] . The two types of dominators become dominates. In the backbone, each node knows the composition of the nodes on its routing path. Figure 3 (a) shows the network topology. In the initial stage, the nodes have the same initial energy consumption and the same probability of becoming malicious nodes. Thus, according to the analysis, one node with a higher degree is selected as a dominator. As shown in Figure 3(a) , the degrees of nodes 12, 13, 14, and 15 are 4, 4, 4, and 4, respectively, whereas the degrees of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, and 17 are 3. Node 12 has a higher degree than the other nodes and a lower node ID. Thus, node 12 is selected as a dominator in the first stage and is colored black in Figure 3(b) . After one dominator is selected, in the following step, node 13 is selected as the dominator as shown in Figure 3(c) . Then, nodes 14, 15, 16, and 17 are selected as dominators in the following steps. Thus, the dominators are selected.
In this paper, when the node sends a data packet to the destination, the abstract information, which includes the ID of the data packet and the sending time of the data packet, is also sent to the destination along the auxiliary routing path to improve the data packet arrival ratio. In Figure 4 (a), the degrees of nodes 12, 13, 14, and 15 are 4, 4, 4, and 4, respectively, whereas the degrees of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, and 17 are 3. Node 12 has a higher degree than the other nodes and a lower node ID. Thus, node 12 is selected as a dominator in the first stage and is colored black in Figure 4 (b). After one dominator is selected, in the following step, node 13 is selected as the dominator, as shown in Figure 4(c) . Then, nodes 14, 15, 16, and 17 are selected as dominators in the following steps. Thus, the dominators are selected.
As shown in Figure 5 , the nodes in the backbone are 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17. These nodes are colored black. One node transmits the data packet to the other nodes along this routing path. However, the nodes in the auxiliary route are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11. The nodes in the backbone and auxiliary routing cover all nodes in the network. That is, the nodes in the network can transmit the data packet to any node in the network, and the nodes know the information of the nodes in the routing path. An example of data transmission is shown in Figure 5 . Node 1 transmits the data packet to node 6 along the routing path 1-13-12-14-16-17-6. However, the abstract information is sent to node 6 along routing path 1-2-3-4-5-6. In this network, malicious nodes drop the data packet with a certain probability. In Figure 5 , when node 1 transmits the data packet to node 6 along the routing path 1-13-12-14-16-17-6, the data packet will be dropped at a certain probability if node 14 is a malicious node. At the same time, a malicious node may be in the routing path 1-2-3-4-5-6. The abstract information is used to warn the destination that a data packet has been transmitted to node 6. If the data packet is dropped by node 14, node 6 cannot receive the data packet from node 1. However, if the node receives the abstract information from node 1, it will know that there are malicious nodes in the routing path 1-13-12-14-16-27-6, and node 6 will evaluate and reduce the trust in the nodes in the routing path. The method of evaluating the nodes is given in the following. However, if node 6 receives the abstract information, the trust in the nodes in the routing path will increase.
In the process of establishing CDS, first of all, network chooses the node with more neighbors as a dominator in the network, so we can know the node with the largest degree as the dominator in the first time, which shows that the time complexity is n. After the first dominator is selected, its complexity is n − 1 when the second dominator is selected. Therefore, after the k dominator nodes are selected, the entire network can be connected as a whole. When the kth dominator nodes are selected, its complexity is n − k + 1. Therefore, the time complexity of the selected dominator in the whole network is n + n − 1 + · · · n − k + 1. When the network picks up the node, its network needs to remove extra nodes in the network, which results in complicated time n. Therefore, establishing a CDS whose time complexity is O(n + n − 1 + · · · n−k +1+n), the time complexity is O(n+n−1+· · · n− k + 1 + n). The time complexity of establishing the auxiliary route is also O(nk + n +
2 ), which shows that the entire time complexity is O(2nk + 2n + k(k − 1)).
(2)The second process for determining malicious nodes is as follows.
By constructing the CDS, the nodes in the network know the composition of the nodes in the routing path. When the packet is not successfully transmitted to the destination node, the trust of nodes in the routing path will reduced. Malicious nodes are intersection nodes in these routing paths, the probability that the trust of malicious nodes will be reduced is higher, and thus, the area in which malicious nodes may be present will be limited in a small range based on their nodes trust. Finally, the malicious nodes will be determined because the trust in malicious nodes is lower than that in normal nodes.
If a node is malicious node, it will attack packet, thus, the destination can determine that this routing path exit malicious nodes. Thus, the probability for attacking packet is higher, and the probability that the node is determined as malicious nodes is higher. In the CDS, nodes will be the intersection of multiple paths. Due to node is in the intersection VOLUME 6, 2018 of multiple paths, the number of times that one malicious node is determined is larger. Thus, the trust is lower. In this paper, the malicious node drops the data packet at a certain probability p; that is, if one data packet is transmitted to a malicious node, the probability that the data packet is attacked is probability p. When node A receives much information about node B, the trust about node B in node A as evaluated by node C is increased, and the node is regarded as a ''good'' node. Otherwise, the node is regarded as a ''bad'' node. The number of times that a node is regarded as a malicious node by destinations is n b , and the number of times that a node is regarded as a ''good'' node is n g . We consider that if n b n b +n g > p, the node is regarded as a malicious node. Otherwise, the node is regarded as a ''good'' node.
In this paper, when the source node sends the data packet to the destination node, the source node also sends abstract information along the auxiliary routing path to the destination node. When there are malicious nodes in the CDS routing path, the malicious nodes will drop the packets with a certain probability, when a malicious node in the CDS routing path drops the packet, if the abstract information transmitted along the auxiliary routing path is successfully transmitted to the destination node, the destination node predicts that there is a malicious node on the CDS routing path and reduce the trust of nodes in the routing path. Although the trust of all the nodes in this routing path decreases, the malicious node may be at intersection of several paths. When multiple nodes in other routing paths transmit data, the malicious node may also discard the data packet. At the same time, the destination node on the other routing path will also evaluates the trust of nodes. Thus, we can see if it is a malicious node, the probability of reducing trust is larger. When nodes exchange predictive node trust degree, malicious nodes are determined. Thus, the malicious nodes can be avoid when establishing CDS to improve network performance.
C. SCHEDULE METHOD OF THE TAIV SCHEME
When a malicious node exists on the CDS route or there is an attack on this routing path, the data packet generated by source node cannot be safely transmitted to the destination node. When the destination node receives the abstract information sent from the source node, the trust of nodes in the routing path will be reduced. After several rounds of data transmission, the area where exit malicious nodes will be determined. Thus, these areas can be well avoided during the next data transmission to improve the network security. For example, a DOS attack on the network, when the network's bandwidth or connectivity is attacked, the data packet does not reach the destination node, so that the above method can well determine the malicious attack area. Network attacks in the network are also valid for DOS attacks and other attacks. Although there are so many attacks in the following reference, As long as these attacks destroy the packets transmitted by the network, the strategy proposed in this paper can well determine the network malicious nodes [59] .
In this paper, nodes transmit data packets to any nodes in the network. The system must first build a backbone in the network. The detailed method for building the backbone is shown in Algorithm 1. is the dominators set, is the dominates set, and B is the neighbor nodes set of dominators in the network. Malicious nodes drop data packets at a certain probability p.
The aim of this paper is to determine malicious nodes and then improve the data packet arrival ratio. Algorithm 2 shows the detailed routing of the TAIV scheme.
Each node in the network will lose the packet with a certain probability in the network for a variety of reasons, however, the situation for packet loss is different from that of a malicious node attacking the packet. The probability for dropping data packet by malicious node is greater than the probability for packet loss of nodes. In the network, when the node transmits packet to destination node, each node will drop the data packet with a smaller probability, therefore, even when a node drops its own packet, the node's trust predicted by the destination decreases at less frequently, but if node trust is lower than a normal node and higher than a malicious node, it can know that the node lost the packet. However, a malicious node in the network will lose the packet with a great probability, especially when a malicious node is at the intersection of several routing paths, and the malicious node have a lower trust, so the speed of reducing trust of malicious node is more rapidly. In general, in this paper, malicious nodes have lower trust than the trust of normal nodes that loss packets, so the proposed method can still effectively identify malicious nodes.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE TAIV SCHEME A. ENERGY CONSUMPTION OF THE TAIV SCHEME
Theorem 1: Consider a network with a number of nodes n. The probability that malicious nodes drop the data packet is p. The ratio of malicious nodes to all nodes in the network is β. For node v i , considering the routing path k passing by node v x , the number of routing paths passing by node v x is = { 1 , 2 , . . . γ }, the number of data packets received by node v x is Q r , and the number of data packets sent by node v x is Q s .
Where Proof: There are n nodes in the network, and the probability that one node transmits a data packet to any node is 
6:
If the energy consumption of node v i is higher than the average energy consumption of the neighbor nodes of node v i then 7:
node v i is selected as the dominator, the ID of node v i is added to = {v i , . . .}, generates data packet P i and transmits to the next node v j along the routing path of the data packet and transmits abstract information S i to the next node v k along the auxiliary routing path.
4:
If v j contains malicious nodes then 5:
the data packet P i will be dropped at a certain probability. 6:
End if 7:
If v k contains malicious nodes then 8:
the data packet S i will be dropped at a certain probability.
9:
End if 10:
If the data packet P i is transmitted to the destination successfully then 11:
v i evaluates the trust in the nodes in the routing path and increases the trust in the nodes ζ i = ζ i + 1. 12:
If the abstract information S i is transmitted to the destination successfully then 14:
v i evaluates the trust in the nodes in the routing path and decreases the trust in the nodes ζ i = ζ i − 1.
15:
End
each node exchanges information about the trust in the evaluated nodes. 20: End for 21: According to the trust in the nodes, malicious nodes will be dropped. 22: While the system reconstructs the backboneDo 23:
nodes with higher trust will be regarded as dominators 24: End while the data packet from the source node v s , the malicious nodes in the upstream nodes in the routing path must transmit the data packet to the next node successfully. Thus, the number of data packets received Q k r is 1 n (1 − p) βw k s−x . There are = { 1 , 2 , . . . γ } routing paths that pass by node v x , and thus the total number of data packets received Q r is as follows.
When node v x receives the data packet, it will transmit the data packet to the next node. If it is a malicious node, it will drop the data packet with probability p. However, if it a ''good'' node, it will transmit the data packet to the next VOLUME 6, 2018 nodes. Thus, for the routing path k , the number of data packets received Q k r is 1 n (1 − p) βw k s−x . The probability that node v x is a malicious node is β, and thus the probability that a data packet is transmitted to the next node successfully is βp when node v x is a malicious node. The number of nodes sending the received data packet is
s−x ) when node v x is a malicious node. However, the number of nodes sending the received data packet is ( 
The number of data packets sent by node v x includes the number of sent data packets received from upstream nodes and the number of data packets generated by itself.
Thus, the total number of data packets sent by node v x in this routing path Q k r is as follows.
Thus,
There are = { 1 , 2 , . . . γ } routing paths that pass by node v x . Thus, the total number of data packets sent Q s is as follows.
Theorem 2: Considering the number of nodes in the network is n. The probability that malicious nodes drop data packet is p. The ratio of malicious nodes to all nodes in the network is β. For node v i , considering the routing path ℘ k in auxiliary routing path pass by node v x , and the number of routing path pass by node v x N = {℘ 1 , ℘ 2 , . . . ℘ γ }, the amount of receiving abstract information of node v x is ψ r , the amount of sending abstract information of node v x is ψ s .
Proof: Nodes send abstract information to destination, the method for transmitting abstract information is the same with the method for transmitting data packet. Thus, the proof method is the same with Theorem 1.
Theorem 3: Considering the amount of receiving data packet of node v x is Q r , the amount of sending data packet of node v x is Q s . The length of data packet is l m , the length of abstract is l n , the amount of receiving abstract information of node v x is ψ r , the amount of sending abstract information of node v x is ψ s . Thus, the energy consumption E x of node v x is as follows.
Proof: In the section 3.2, the energy model is given. According to its energy consumption model, we know that the network only needs to know the amount of received data and the amount of data sent by the node from theorem 1 and theorem 2, so that if the node's transmission distance is less than a fixed value, the energy consumption of the received message is l m (Q s + ψ s ) E elec +lε fs d 2 . If the node's transmission distance is less than a fixed value, the energy consumption of the received message is l m (Q s + ψ s ) E elec + lε fs d 4 . Meanwhile, its energy consumption for sending information is l n (Q r + ψ r ) E elec .
The metrics chosen are the amount of data packet, energy consumption, the probability for receiving data packet, and the arrival ratio of data packet. The amount of data packet shows that the amount of data loaded by nodes is used to calculate energy consumption of nodes. The energy consumption is mainly chosen to indicate that there is enough energy in the area far away from sink to build CDSs; selecting the probability for receiving data packet explains that the proposed scheme can avoid malicious nodes to ensure network security; the arrival ratio of data packet indicates that the proposed scheme can improve arrival ratio of data packet to ensure network security compared with previous schemes.
In this paper, section 5 gives the analysis of the network performance. The parameters of simulation network environment are: the ratio of number of malicious nodes in the network to all nodes in the network is 0.1 in the network, the probability of a malicious node dropping a packet is 0.8, and the number of nodes in the network is 20. In a full multipath strategy, a node can transmit data packets to any node in the network. When a node needs to transmit data packets, the node transmit data packet using shortest path. That is, when node A transmits data packets to node B, node A selects a neighbor node that is close to node B to transmit data packet, and then transmit them sequentially until the data packets are transmitted to Node B, but network cannot quickly determine the number of malicious nodes.
From the theorem, we can see that the data amount borne by the nodes in the network is Figure 6 and Figure 7 , and the energy consumption of nodes in the network is shown in Figure 8 according to the energy consumption formula in 3.2. The number of data of nodes in TAIV scheme is given in Figure 6 . The number of receiving data packet and sending data packet in TAIV scheme and multi-path scheme are given in the Figure 7 . It can be seen that in TAIV scheme, nodes 12, 14, 16 nodes bear more data, while the previous nodes bear less data, mainly because in the TAIV strategy, the node is selected as the CDS, and then the node transmits the data along the CDS. It makes some nodes in the network bear more data packets, the amount of data transmitted by nodes in the CDS is more. So in the multi-path scheme, the nodes 12, 14, and 16 take up more data, but other nodes bear more data than the nodes in the TAIV scheme. In Figure 8 , the energy consumption of nodes in a TAIV policy is not different from the energy consumption of nodes in a multi-path scheme.
B. THE DATA PACKET ARRIVAL RATIO

Theorem 4:
Node v i transmits the data packet to node v j , and the abstract information is also sent to node v j along a different routing path. Considering the number of hops of node v i to node v j is in the backbone routing path, the number of hops of node v i to node v j is η in the auxiliary routing path. The probability that the data packet is dropped by malicious nodes is ρ, and the ratio of malicious nodes in the network to all nodes in the network is β. The probability of receiving the data packet at destination v j is i→j , and the probability of receiving the abstract information at destination v j is H i→j :
Proof: Consider that the number of hops of node v i to node v j is in the backbone routing path. The probability that the data packet is dropped by malicious nodes is ρ, and thus the probability that node v j does not receive the data packet at each hop is 1 − ρ. Thus, the probability of receiving the data packet at destination v j is i→j = (1 − ρ) β . The number of hops of node v i to node v j is η in the auxiliary routing path, and thus the probability of receiving the abstract information at node v j is H i→j = (1 − ρ) ηβ .
FIGURE 9. The probability for receiving data packet in different probability of dropping a data packet of malicious node.
According to theorem 4, the probabilities of receiving the information as a function of different probabilities of dropping a data packet by the malicious node and different hop counts are shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10 , respectively. It can be seen that in TAIV scheme, the probability for receiving data packet in TAIV scheme is higher than the probability of receiving data packet in multi-path scheme. The reason is that the abstract information in TAIV scheme is also transmitted to the destination, thus the probability for VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 10. The probability for receiving data packet in different hop counts to destinations.
identifying malicious node is increased to improve network security.
Infer 1: Considering node v i sends M data packet to node v j , node v j sends N abstract information to node v j , The probability that data packet is dropped by malicious nodes is ρ. The ratio of malicious nodes to the network is β. The probability that destination v j receives at least one data packet is F i→j , the probability that destination v j receives at least one abstract information is ℵ i→j .
Proof: According to above analysis, if node sends one data packet to destination, and node sends one abstract information to destination. The probability for receiving data packet of destination v j is F i→j = (1 − ρ) β , thus, the probability that node doesn't receive data packet is (1 − (1 − ρ) β ) M , thus the probability that destination receives at least one data packet is
The probability for receiving abstract information of destination v j is ℵ i→j = (1 − ρ) ηβ , thus, the probability that node doesn't receive abstract information is (1 − (1 − ρ) ηβ ) N . Thus, the probability that destination receives at least one abstract information is
The probability that destination v j receives at least one data packet in different probability of dropping malicious node and different number of hops is given in Figure 11 and Figure 12 , respectively. The larger the probability for dropping data packet of malicious nodes is, the probability that destination v j receives at least one data packet is increased. The reason is that the number of malicious nodes is lager, the probability that the malicious nodes are selected as dominators. When data packet is transmitted to destination, the probability that the data packet is dropped by malicious nodes is higher. Thus, the probability that destination receives at least one data packet decline. FIGURE 11. The probability that destination receives at least one data packet in different probability of dropping a data packet of malicious node. FIGURE 12. The probability that destination receives at least one data packet in different number of hops.
Theorem 5:
Considering only malicious nodes drop data packets at a certain probability, the probability that malicious nodes drop the data packet or the abstract information is p, and the number of rounds of data transmission is as follows when one malicious node is identified
Proof: For one round of data transmission, considering node v x is a malicious node and one routing path k passes by node v x , the hop number from the source node to destination v y is w k s−y , the hop number from the source node v s to node v x is w k s−x , and the hop number from node v x to destination v y is w k x−y . The density of malicious nodes is β. For routing path k , because only malicious nodes in the network drop data packets, if a malicious node drops one data packet, the node will be identified as a malicious node. For routing path k , the probability that node v x receives the data packet P k from source node v s is (1 − p) βw k s−x . Thus, the probability that node v x drops data packet P k is p(1 − p)
in routing path k . That is, when node v s sends one data packet P k to node v y , the probability that node v x drops data packet P k is p (1 − p) βw k s−x . Considering = { 1 , 2 , . . . γ } routing paths pass by node v x . Thus, after one round of data transmission, the probability x that node v x drops the data packet is as follows. (16) That is, when the source node v s sends one data packet, the number of data packets dropped by node v x is 1 × x = γ z= 1
p(1 − p)
βw k s−x after one round of data packets. Only malicious nodes drop data packets in the network, and thus if one data packet is dropped, the node will be identified as a malicious node. Thus, the number of data rounds is To identify malicious nodes, the number of data packets that must be sent by the source node is shown in Figure 13 . As the number of hops increases, the average number of data packets sent by the source node increase. When the number of malicious nodes is greater, the average number of data packets sent by the source node is greater.
In order to determine the malicious nodes, the arrival ratio of data packet is shown in Figure 14 , and the ratio of arrival ratio of data packet is shown in Figure 15 . The number of determining malicious node is shown in Figure 16 . In the TAIV scheme, as the data packet rounds increase, the data packet arrival ratio increases. However, in the multipath scheme, the data packet arrival ratio remains nearly unchanged. This paper builds the network routing through the establishment of CDS, and thus the nodes know the node information in the routing path. When the packet is not transmitted to the destination node, the trust in the nodes in the routing path is reduced. After a period of time, the trust in the malicious node will be lower than the trust in the normal nodes, and the malicious nodes will be avoided in the construction of CDS to improve network security. Thus, the TAIV scheme has better performance than the traditional scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
Most previous schemes have not considered malicious nodes in the network. The network considered in this paper contains malicious nodes, and the malicious nodes drop data packets. Thus, the arrival ratio of the data packets decreases. To improve the data packet arrival ratio, the TAIV scheme was proposed. In this scheme, when the source nodes send one data packet to the destination, an abstract information is also transmitted to the destination. Thus, if malicious nodes in the backbone drop the data packet but the destination receives the abstract information from the source node, the destination will know that the routing path in the backbone contains malicious nodes, and the destination will reduce its evaluation of the trust in the nodes in the routing path. After several rounds of data packet transmission, the nodes will communicate with each other. If node has lower trust, the node will be identified as a malicious node. Thus, in the next round of data packet transmission, the malicious node will not be selected as a node in the backbone, and thus the data packet arrival ratio will improve after several rounds of data packet transmission. Thus, this strategy is very favorable. 
